

Attacks on Houses of Worship

2024 Year in Review





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About Faith-Based ISAO

The FB-ISAO provides members with information, analysis, and capabilities to help reduce risk while enhancing preparedness, security, and resilience. The FB-ISAO is an all-faiths and all-hazards information-sharing organization. If you are not yet a member of FB-ISAO, learn more about the benefits of membership.

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Introduction

The Faith-Based Information Sharing & Analysis Organization (FB-ISAO) provides members with information, analysis, and capabilities to help reduce risk while enhancing preparedness, security, and resilience. We are an all-faiths and all-hazards information-sharing organization.

The FB-ISAO <u>Operational Resilience Working Group</u> (ORG) constantly monitors the threat environment to support our threat assessment mission. Timely threat analysis and situational awareness require a steady and reliable stream of current threat information to establish a baseline, conduct analysis, and spot developing trends. Ideally, the data is collected and distributed as it is reported. While groups like the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, National Consortium for the

Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Violence Prevention Project, Family Research Council, and the FBI (among others) periodically share their collections, their reporting is often delayed; moreover, they tend only to collect incidents affecting their mission, faith, or ethnic group to the exclusion of others. Government collections often exclude threats, protests, and violent acts that fall under First

By incorporating an all-faith approach, FB-ISAO unites, builds trust, and strengthens resiliency among the entire community of faith, and enhances publicprivate partnership.

Amendment-protected speech, as these threats typically fall outside the scope of their mandated reporting. Moreover, the FBI and other governmental organizations are limited to those incidents that are officially reported to them, which may contribute to undercounting.

To remedy these shortcomings, in 2023, FB-ISAO initiated an experimental project to collect, collate, analyze, and assess threats and attacks on U.S. Houses of Worship (HOWs). The ORG chose HOWs as the unit of analysis, as opposed to the broader category of faith-based organizations, to keep the scale of the endeavor manageable and to bypass debate over which entities are or are not faith-based organizations, thereby avoiding potential skewing of the results.



Methodology

Data is collected daily from an AI-filtered data stream of 400 open-source websites and RSS feeds, which are published or maintained by news media, news aggregators, non-profit research organizations, online commentators, social media sources, and government agencies. The collection spans the ideological, political, and religious spectra. While not exhaustive, the effort produces a robust and varied stream of reporting that can be collated rapidly, analyzed, and made available for near real-time assessments.

- All data are open-source and publicly reported online or in print media.
- Incidents are drawn from reports of arson, assault, bombings, cyber-attacks, hostile disturbances or disruptions of faith services, graffiti, harassment, kidnaps, vehicular assaults (ramming), hostile surveillance and intelligence collection, theft, communicated threats, trespass, and vandalism. Incidents are categorized by type,

geographic location (state), where on the HOW's campus the incident occurred (interior, exterior, parking lot, or street), casualties, weapons or implements used, the theme or apparent purpose of the incident, the HOW's professed faith, suspect identification by type, and a brief description of the event. Peaceful protests are not included unless they produce one or more of the listed incident types. Hybrid incidents (such as vandalism

Effective data and analysis can help filter out what is feared and could happen and help an individual house of worship focus on what is likely to happen and what needs to be protected against.

- during theft or theft resulting in arson) are treated as a single incident. If a perpetrator leaves the scene and subsequently returns, each occurrence is counted separately.
- Every incident included in the data set is hyperlinked to an online source, except for incidents reported to FB-ISAO's Slack channel as a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) or those included in a consortium data collection without further attribution (USCCB).



• With very few exceptions, only incidents with specific targets identified by name and/or precise location are included. In cases involving bomb threats or other threats of violence, only reports specifically identifying recipients by name, physical address, or email are included. Similarly, reports indicating that an occurrence is the "nth such incident this period" only include those incidents where specific dates, target ID, and details are provided. Following these practices, ORG errs on the side of caution, protecting the distribution from overreporting and overcounting.

Yearly Comparison

As shown in **Figure 1**, FB-ISAO recorded a total of 841 attacks on HOWs in 2024, compared to 1,027 attacks in 2023, representing an 18% year-on-year decline. 70% of that difference is attributable to the decrease in bomb threats. While 2023 saw a surge of bomb threats in the second half of the year, 2024 recorded a substantial decline in those events from 214 to 86.¹




Figure 1: Total Incidents Including Bomb Threats, by Year

¹ FB-ISAO 2023 Report for additional analysis of the 2023 increase in bomb.



Figure 2 shows that while some of the peak activity observed towards the end of 2023 continued into the start of 2024, the data began to normalize as the months progressed.




Figure 2: Incidents by Month

Incidents by Faith

Over the course of 2024, 93% of all incidents targeted four religious groups.

- 49% Protestant
- 21% Jewish
- 16% Catholic
- 7% Islam

These numbers disproportionately affect Jewish, Catholic, and Muslim communities compared to their representation in the U.S. population. A 2022 <u>Duke University Study</u> found that among U.S. houses of worship, 85% are Protestant, 6% are Catholic, 3.2% are Jewish, and 0.7% are Muslim. This data reinforces the conclusion that perpetrators disproportionately target Jewish, Catholic, and Muslim houses of worship. **Figure 3** below details the distribution of attacks by faith.






Figure 3: Distribution of Attacks by Faith

A closer look at the year-over-year comparison of incidents by faith is shown in **Figure 4.** Amongst the four groups that saw the highest number of incidents, only attacks on Muslim facilities increased. Attacks on Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant houses of worship decreased, and with the easing of bomb threats, attacks on synagogues decreased significantly. Hindu facilities saw the most significant increase, with a 600% jump from 2 to 14 attacks over the course of the year.

	2023	2024			
Protestant	440	415	-6%		
Jewish	329	180	-45%		
Catholic	147	137	-7%		
Islam	47	56	19%		
Buddhist	14	10	-29%		
LDS	12	12	0%		
Sikh	5	0	-100%		
unk	4	9	125%		
Orthodox	3	2	-33%		
Messianic	2	1	-50%		
Satanic	2	4	100%		
Hindu	2	14	600%		

Figure 4: Attacks by Faith Year-over-Year

Types of Attacks

The types of attacks that HOWs experienced in the past year are displayed in **Figure 5**. Vandalism, theft, and assault emerged as the most prevalent, together accounting for



nearly 57% of all reported incidents. When expanded to include arson, graffiti, and bomb threats, these six incident types comprised approximately 84% of the total, underscoring the concentration of activity within that subset of attack types.




Figure 5: Attack Types

A majority, 80% of reported incidents targeted property, including buildings, religious objects such as statuary and relics, reinforcing concerns about the vulnerability of physical infrastructure. In contrast, only 20% of attacks were directed at individuals, including physical assaults, harassment, and threats. Less frequent incident types, such as cyber threats, vehicle ramming, trespassing, and hoaxes, were reported fewer than ten times (<1%) each.

The continued dominance of property-related crimes, particularly vandalism and graffiti, highlights the persistent risk faith-based institutions face and underscores the importance of preventive measures and incident response planning. In **Figure 6**, the incident distribution by type for the past two years is shown.






Figure 6: Attack Types Year on Year Comparison

Property crimes, unlike communicated threats and harassment, require physical access to the targeted facility, thereby increasing the chances of perpetrators being captured on CCTV or witnessed in the act. Vandalism remained the most frequent incident in both years, though it showed a slight decrease from 30% in 2023 to 28% in 2024.

Communicated threats of violence accounted for 18% of all reported incidents in 2024, compared to 28% in 2023, representing a decline of 36%. Unlike property crimes, communicated threats do not require physical access to the location in question. They can be conducted virtually through electronic means and may never be acted upon. The growing incidence of theft, assault, and arson, and the shift away from virtual activity like bomb and other communicated threats, underscores a penchant for risk and doing actual physical harm.

Primary Weapons and Implements Used

The distribution of weapons and objects used in incidents is illustrated in **Figure 7**. The most frequently reported physical implement in attacks was "hands" (27%), representing physical assaults without weapons, blunt instruments, or specified tools. Nearly a fifth (18%) of all attacks involved communicated threats, the majority of which were delivered



verbally (11%), while the rest were sent via email (7%), other cyber means (1%), or physical mail and parcels (less than 1% combined). These types of threats do not require physical proximity to the target.




Figure 7: Types of Weapons & Objects Used

Only 13% of incidents involved a weapon, up from 9% the previous year. Thirteen percent (13%) of incidents had no reported mention of weapons or implements.

Among the identified weapons and implements recorded:

- Weapons were used in 13% of incidents, including:
 - o Firearms (10%) -handguns (9%) and rifles (1%)
 - Bladed weapons (3%)
- Improvised incendiary devices and accelerants were present in 4% of cases.
- Paint and graffiti tools accounted for 10% of incidents, with spray paint used in 9% and markers in 1%
- Blunt objects such as rocks, bricks, and concrete were used in 4% of cases, and other blunt items (bats, batons, sticks, chairs) in 6%

The data indicate that a facility is three times more likely to be attacked using paint, rocks, or hands than with a bladed weapon or firearm, emphasizing the prevalence of low-tech, accessible tools in these attacks. Moreover, many of these items were found lying around on-site, including bricks, rocks, tools, cans, and broken concrete, which allow for spontaneous crimes of opportunity. Policing the grounds, storing away tools



and used construction materials, and rethinking the use of rocks and decorative stones in landscaping are low-cost, no-cost measures to protect facilities from vandalism.

Locations Where Attacks Occurred

Geographic Location

A review of the 2024 data reveals significant regional concentration. Half of all attacks occurred in just nine states, as outlined in **Figure 8** (see Appendix A – Incidents by State for a full breakdown of incidents by state). California (82 incidents) and New York (64 incidents) stand out as the top two states with the highest number of reported incidents.

Other states with high counts include Pennsylvania, Florida, and Texas, which together represent a significant portion (37%) of the total incidents and roughly track their respective populations. Four new states —MD, VA, MN, and MA —entered the top 10 this year, replacing OH, GA, NC, and WA.




Figure 8: Top 10 States

There was some consistency among the states with the highest concentration of incidents, as all states in the top 5 for 2024 were among the top 6 last year. Additional key highlights include:

- California was the top location for arson, assaults, and attacks on Jews.
- New York was #1 in thefts, graffiti, and attacks on Catholics.
- Pennsylvania ranked #1 for vandalism and tied for first in graffiti.
- Texas had the most attacks on Protestants.
- Minnesota was the site of the most significant number of attacks on Muslim HOWs.



Colorado was #1 for publicly documented bomb threats

This concentration suggests that while incidents are geographically spread across the country, the bulk of these events occur in a small number of states. The fact that these states also appear regularly at the top in various threat categories, such as vandalism, bomb threats, and arson, highlights the need (and opportunity) for focused preventive measures in these areas. The overall trend indicates that a disproportionate number of attacks are happening in specific hotspots, necessitating regional strategies for protecting faith-based communities.

There is a critical need to keep threat assessments timely and relevant to maintain a strong support and safety posture. The threat landscape is constantly evolving, with perpetrators becoming increasingly mobile and adaptive. It is essential to report incidents to law enforcement, and maintaining strong relationships with local law enforcement and the FBI is highly valuable.

Location Within the Facility

As shown in **Figure 9,**18% of attacks occur virtually via email, phone, social media, online, or even unrealized plots and threats against HOWs. However, the clear majority of attacks occurred in physical space, on the grounds or inside a house of worship.




Figure 9: Attack Locations



Among physical attacks, the exterior of buildings was the most common setting, in 51% of incidents. Five percent of the incidents occurred in the parking lot, and 3% in the street immediately outside the building. A quarter of attacks occurred inside the targeted facility. Virtual incidents included email-based threats (8%), phone threats (4%), verbal threats (1%), mail threats (1%), and cyber platforms such as social media and Zoom (each with a rate of less than 1%).

Figure 10 illustrates that the locations where incidents occur vary according to the type of incident. Unsurprisingly, the majority of property crimes and physical crimes against people occurred outside of the HOWs. The majority of thefts, however, occur inside facilities. Most threats were communicated virtually, electronically, or verbally, highlighted by 93% of bomb threats being delivered virtually.

	EXT	INT	eV
Vandalism	79%	21%	0%
Assault	67%	33%	0%
Graffiti	98%	2%	0%
Theft	36%	62%	1%
Arson	63%	37%	0%
Harassment	52%	23%	26%
AssaultThreat	33%	12%	55%
Threat	21%	6%	74%
BombThreat	6%	1%	93%

Figure 10: Attack Location by Incident Type

Incidents Involving Casualties

There were 67 (8%) attacks on houses of worship that resulted in casualties, an increase of 15 incidents, nearly 30% over last year's 52 incidents. Across the incidents FB-ISAO recorded last year, 23 people were killed and 78 were wounded (compared to 28 dead and 59 injured in the previous year). Both the number of incidents in which people were hurt (up 30%) and the total number of casualties (up 16%) increased in 2024 despite an overall 18% decrease in the total number of attacks. This means that while the overall number of incidents fell, lethality climbed.



Figure 11 provides details on those reported casualties. Protestant HOWs absorbed the highest rate of deadly attacks, with 83% (19) of the total killed. Additionally, Protestants experienced just over half of all the wounded in incidents last year.

AFFILIATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	WEAPON	KILLED	WOUNDED	
Buddhist	0	0	handgun	17 (74%)	36 (46%)	
Catholic	1 (4%)	13 (17%)	hands	1 (4%)	13 (17%)	
Hindu	1 (4%)	2 (3%)	bladed	1 (4%)	9 (12%)	
			rifle	1 (4%)	2 (3%)	
Islam	2 (9%)	9 (12%)	spike	1 (4%)	0	
Jewish	0	3 (4%)	unk	2 (9%)	0	
LDS	0	7 (9%)	vehicle	0	7 (9%)	
Messianic	0	0	fireworks	0	6 (8%)	
Orthodox	0	1 (1%)	cane	0	1 (1%)	
Protestant	19 (83%)	40 (51%)	chairs	0	1 (1%)	
	19 (03/0)	40 (31%)	rocks	0	1 (1%)	
Satanic	0	0	sharp object	0	1 (1%)	
unk	nk 0 3 (4%)		teeth	0	1 (1%)	
Grand Total	23 (100%)	78 (100%)	Grand Total	23	78	

Figure 11: Casualties by Faith and Type of Weapon

Handguns were responsible for 74% (17) of those deaths, while also accounting for 46% (36) of less-than-lethal wounds. No other identified weapon type resulted in more than one death. Besides handguns, only hands 17% (13) and blades 12% (13) saw a double-digit percentage of injuries.

Seven people were wounded in vehicle ramming incidents, amounting to 7% of total casualties (and 9% of non-fatal injuries) occurring in fewer than 1% of incidents. We have seen ramming used regularly in recent years, particularly against large outdoor gatherings such as marches, parades, demonstrations, and holiday markets. Given that trend, FBOs are encouraged to pay greater consideration to this attack method, protecting people from vehicular access, especially when planning outdoor events, such as outdoor services.

As **Figure 12** shows, nearly three-quarters (73%) of casualties occurred outside the HOW, on the grounds, in the parking lot, or on the street. The quarter who were harmed inside buildings represented an 8% decrease from 2023 – underscoring the importance of maintaining secure perimeters to keep harm outside.






Figure 12: Location of Incidents with Casualties

Notable Observed Themes

Several themes emerge from the data that warrant deeper exploration. The first examines the primary motivator for incidents. **Figure 13** visualizes the motivations behind reported incidents and categorizes them as either hate-driven or property-driven crime. Of the incidents with a known or likely motive, 45% were hate-based, while 33% were property-focused.




Figure 13: Property versus Hate Crime

Within the hate category (45% of all incidents), the largest single segment is antisemitism, accounting for 159 cases (19%). Other notable hate-driven motivations



include desecration (7%), LGBTQ-related incidents (4%), Islamophobia (4%), racism (2%), interpersonal or doctrinal disputes (8%), and abortion (1%), among other ideologically rooted acts – all reflecting bias, identity-based targeting, and extremism.

In contrast, the property-motivated category (33% overall) includes theft (20%), mischief (10%), and other property crimes (1%). These typically involved damage or loss of materials or facilities without explicitly identifiable ideological intent.

Another notable trend was the clear and notable shift from threats to physical violence, highlighted in **Figure 14**. In 2023, threats such as bomb threats (21%), assault threats (6%), and harassment made up nearly one-third of reported incidents. However, in 2024, the number of bomb threats dropped by 10%. In contrast, physical violence indicators rose 35%: assault incidents increased from 8% to 12%, and theft rose from 12% to 17%. This pattern suggests a troubling trend in which verbal or implied threats have morphed into direct action.




Figure 14: Threats versus Violence

Figure 15 showcases the ongoing challenge with identifying and classifying suspects. In a staggering 62% of cases, no perpetrator is identified. Among the remaining 38% where a suspect categorization can be made, over 1/3 (36%) appear ideological or politically motivated, with Israel/Palestine-related issues accounting for half of that total. Homelessness (9%) and mental illness (10%), which often overlap, make up a sizable



chunk – nearly one-fifth of suspects. Finally, the 26 (9%) incidents involving insiders should not be overlooked. Insider threat is a concern for all organizations, and continues to be an issue for HOWs, particularly regarding theft. CISA offers excellent <u>insider threat</u> <u>mitigation strategies</u> that all organizations are encouraged to review and implement.




Figure 15: Suspect Categorization

In **Figure 16**, we can see that the types of attacks vary according to the faith of the target. Mosques, Protestant, and Catholic churches are more likely to be the victims of kinetic or physical attacks such as vandalism, theft, assaults, and arson, while synagogues are subject to virtual or psychological attacks such as threats and harassment.

	Jewish	Potessant	Gamone	lslam	
Vandalism	12%	28%	45%	36%	ĺ
Theft	3%	24%	12%	13%	
Assault	7%	13%	12%	18%	
Arson	3%	14%	8%	5%]
Trespass	2%	0%	1%	4%	1
Ramming	1%	1%	0%	0%	1
Kinetic	27%	80%	78%	75%	
Graffiti	13%	6%	9%	5%	
BombThreat	36%	3%	4%	2%	
Harassment	9%	2%	1%	11%]
AssaultThreat	4%	4%	5%	4%]
Threat	8%	3%	2%	4%	
Cyber	1%	1%	1%	0%	
Hoax	0%	0%	0%	0%	
Disturbance	1%	0%	0%	0%	
Virtual	72%	19%	22%	25%	

Figure 16: Attack Types by Faith

This is consistent with the findings depicted in **Figure 17**, which shows the locations of on-site attacks. Fully 49% of attacks against Jewish synagogues were virtual (email,



phone, verbal, cyber), versus between 7-9% for other faiths. While 27% to 32% of attacks against Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim houses of worship took place inside their facilities, fewer than 6% occurred inside synagogues. Additional research might examine the extent to which the perception of facility hardening at Jewish HOWs plays a role in the reduced incidence of physical attacks on them.




Figure 17: Attack Location by Faith

Finally, **Figure 18** examines the relationship between the imputed causes of incidents and the fate of the target. The chart aggregates attacks into four primary categories: theft, hate, mischief, and interpersonal disputes. Considering the significant number of incidents which were motivated by the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas (detailed in **Figure 13**), seeing antisemitism (86%) and Islamophobia (71%) as a driver factor behind attacks on those faiths is not surprising. Meanwhile, theft rather than hate is behind the majority of attacks on Protestant, Buddhist, and Hindu HOWs.




Figure 18: Proximate Cause by Faith



Key Findings and Conclusions

Adequate security begins with timely, accurate threat analysis. There is no universal solution to protecting houses of worship. While certain best practices, such as limiting entrances, practicing situational awareness, and expanding perimeters, remain essential, the threat landscape is not uniform. Risk varies by location, faith community, and local threat dynamics.

Security is not static. As threats evolve, previously effective measures may no longer offer adequate protection. Houses of worship must treat security as a continuous process, updating their strategies, training, and mitigation plans to reflect current realities. That requires more than reacting to fear or perception; it demands focused attention on actual, present-day threats and an honest assessment of what has changed since the last review.

Being an all-faiths and all-hazards information-sharing organization affords FB-ISAO the unique vantage point of looking at the threat landscape from the all-faiths lens as opposed to other organizations who may have a singular focus on a particular faith or denomination; but also, to examine the full spectrum of threats and attacks that diverse faith-based institutions face.

By grounding decisions in real-time data and threat intelligence, houses of worship can distinguish between what is feared and what is likely, and take appropriate, proportionate steps to protect their communities. The implications below underscore the importance of resilience grounded in fact-based, data-driven strategies, rather than outdated assumptions.

- Attacks in 2024 decreased 18% over 2023. The most significant decrease was in bomb threats.
- Despite the overall decline in numbers, violence and casualties increased.
- While only 8% of incidents had casualties, with 23 killed and 78 wounded (up from 5% in 2023), the number of violent incidents was up 33% from 2023.
- The majority (96%) involved assaults, including ramming, kidnapping, and suicide.
- One injury occurred during a robbery, and two casualty-inducing incidents involved fireworks pranks that injured six people.



- We train for the worst case, the active assailant. Yet firearms and bladed weapons were reported in only 13% of incidents but that number increased 30% from last year. The most common implements reported remain fists and everyday objects found on the scene, including rocks, bricks, and other blunt objects. Keeping grounds clean of rocks, scrap, and items that can be repurposed as weapons or tools for vandalism may significantly reduce damage to statuary, windows, and building exteriors.
- Attacks on Jewish, Muslim, and Catholic HOWs whose congregations represent <10% of all HOWs continue to be targeted disproportionately, in 44% of attacks. This number is down from last year, when they were targeted in 51% of attacks.
- Hardening entrances and barriers to entry pays off: 73% (up from 67% last year) of incidents involving casualties occurred outside the house of worship. Fences, locked doors, and security patrols can save lives by keeping assailants at bay.
- Incidents with Casualties: Handguns were used in 31 (46%) of the 67 incidents with casualties; bladed weapons in 9 (13%). Long guns were used in only one incident. Hands, teeth, chairs, canes, spikes, and fireworks also appeared.
- Targets vary by location, religion, and demographics. The types and targets of attack vary by religion and state. Threat assessments should take into consideration the identity and location of the HOWs.
- Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia experienced at least one incident, all except Montana and Hawaii. Half of all incidents were clustered in 9 states, the same as last year, but in different nine states.
- In light of the ongoing threat to HOWs of all faiths, the FB-ISAO wants to encourage communities to explore the CISA-developed guidance "Physical Security Performance Goals for Faith-Based Communities" and to encourage members to continue to report incidents to the appropriate law enforcement, as well as on FB-ISAO's Slack Workspace.



Appendix A – Incidents by State

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Appendix B – Case Study: Attacks on Protestant Churches

There were 415 attacks on Protestant churches during 2024, down 6% from the 440 recorded in 2023. During the course of the year, these attacks killed 19 people and wounded another 40.


The most common weapons utilized were handguns (causing 74% of fatalities, 46% of non-lethal casualties), fists (4% of fatalities and 17% non-lethal casualties), and bladed weapons (4% of fatalities and 9% non-lethal casualties).

	Protestant	
Vandalism	28%	
Theft	24%	
Arson	14%	
Assault	13%	
Graffiti	6%	
Ramming	1%	

Looking at attack types, 28% of attacks on Protestant churches involved vandalism, 24% theft, 14% arson, 13% assault, 6% graffiti, and 1% vehicle ramming—the remaining 14% of attacks involved speech-related offenses, including threats, harassment, and hacking.

The identity of the perpetrator is unknown in 62.5% of all attacks on Protestant churches. The perpetrator's identity or motivation, where that information can be

gleaned, is shown in the attached chart in 38% of cases. The majority (55%) of all attacks were conducted by criminals, people protesting gay rights, juveniles, and mischief makers. Insiders who were members of the congregation conducted 13% of attacks; homeless and mentally ill individuals 16%, and



people involved in disputes either with the church or other members, 5%. Individuals motivated by political ideology conducted less than 8% of the incidents. 4% objected to the church's stand on Israel and Palestine, and racists or neo-Nazis perpetrated 3% of attacks. There was only one incident that could be attributed to Islamic terrorism. It



involved an 18-year-old Idaho convert to Islam who claimed he was planning to attack churches in Coeur d'Alene with "guns, 'flame-covered weapons', explosives, knives and a pipe" in the name of ISIS.

The distribution of suspect motivations for each type of incident perpetrated against Protestant churches can be seen in the figure below. Politically motivated assailants confined themselves to vandalism, graffiti, and threats. The types of incidents to which a church security team might be engaged to respond were perpetrated by criminals, juveniles, insiders, the homeless, mentally ill, and people involved in interpersonal disputes. The FBI interdicted the one case involving a potential Islamic terrorist well before it came to fruition.

	Vandalism	Theft	Assault	Arson	Graffiti	Assault The	Threat	Bomb Threst	Cyber	Harassment	Rammine	Disturbance	Surveillance	Kidnap	Suicide
criminal	2	24	7		1				1						1
anti-LGBTQ	18	2			4		1		2						
juveniles, mischief	13	1		5	1		2				1				
insiders	4	2	5	1		2	1			1	1	1	1	1	
homeless	6	1	2	3				1							
mentally ill	3		4	2		1	2								
dispute			4			3				1					
Palestine	4	1			2										
racists, neo-nazis	3							2							
other	1	1			1										
ISIS						1									
155	54	32	22	11	9	7	6	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1

Attacks on Protestant Churches by Type and Type of Assailant