Faith-Based Daily Awareness Post 13 August 2026

These updates are shared to help raise the situational awareness of Faith-Based organizations to best defend against and mitigate the impacts from all-hazards threats including physical security, cybersecurity, and natural disasters.

Nine Percent of the Attacks. Twenty-Six Percent of the Casualties.

The Christian Warrior Training article examines the FBI’s 2025 active shooter data through the lens of houses of worship. The FBI recorded 34 active shooter incidents in 2025, including three at churches—about 9% of all incidents. Those three church attacks accounted for 43 of 166 total casualties, or 26%. It is important to point out that the 26% figure can be misleading because one Minneapolis attack accounted for 30 of those casualties. Looking across a larger five-year period, however, the FBI recorded seven church attacks and 54 casualties from 2021–2025, an average of 7.7 casualties per incident compared with 4.9 across all other tracked location types.

The article also highlights that two of the three 2025 church attacks began outside the building, reinforcing that threats may develop in parking lots or around the exterior rather than entering through a main entrance. Another notable finding is that two of the three church attackers had a prior connection to the congregation, while nationally 15 of 34 shooters had some connection to their target or victims. The article also points to the FBI’s finding that 23 of 34 shooters (68%) demonstrated predatory behavior, meaning they planned and prepared for the attack, compared with 58% in 2024.

One of the most useful themes is the importance of time, observation, and early reporting rather than simply focusing on an armed response. The article notes that the average law enforcement response time to the three church attacks was 2 minutes and 59 seconds, while two of the attacks were largely over within roughly two to four minutes. The FBI also found that 21 of the 34 2025 attacks were over before law enforcement arrived. The article connects this gap to the value of recognizing concerning behavior, communicating observations quickly, and having trained people who understand their role during an emergency. It also highlights the FBI’s finding that concerning behaviors can include testing or asking questions about a potential target’s security, and notes that several 2025 attacks were disrupted after someone reported concerning behavior or communications.

Analyst Comments: The article provides a useful faith-based perspective on the FBI’s 2025 data, but the numbers are important to view in context. Three church incidents represented 9% of active shooter incidents and 26% of casualties, but the casualty figure was heavily influenced by a single incident in Minneapolis. For houses of worship, the more meaningful takeaway is the broader pattern: two of the three church attacks began outside the building, two involved individuals with previous connections to the church, and 68% of all 2025 active shooters demonstrated predatory behavior.

This builds on the 2025 FBI reporting previously referenced in the DAP, reinforcing the value of looking beyond the stereotypical “unknown attacker” scenario. Familiarity with congregants, awareness of concerning behavior, communication with local law enforcement, and understanding activity around the entire property can all contribute to a more complete picture of risk. The FBI itself emphasizes that recognizing and reporting concerning behaviors can play an important role in preventing violence. At the same time, the relatively small number of church incidents is worth keeping in perspective; the data supports preparedness and awareness without creating a sense that active shooter violence is an inevitable threat facing every congregation.

Plugged In and Exposed: The Growing Cybersecurity Threat To EV Charging Infrastructure

Flare’s article looks at the cybersecurity risks that come with the growing number of connected EV chargers. The research found 1,000 internet-facing EV charging endpoints across 56 countries, with 720 (72%) accepting connections without transport encryption. Flare stresses that this does not mean those chargers were compromised, but it does show that a significant portion of the observed infrastructure has exposed communications that could create opportunities for attackers. The article also points to previous incidents involving charger defacement, exposed customer information, and remote control of charging equipment. One particularly relevant finding is that three software platforms accounted for about one-third of the observed exposure, meaning a weakness in a commonly used platform could potentially affect many different charging locations.

Analyst Comments: As more houses of worship add EV chargers for members, visitors, and staff, the charger becomes another internet-connected technology on the property. A poorly secured charger can introduce risks involving network access, payment information, personal data, and potentially other systems if the charger is connected to the same network as church operations. Flare’s findings provide a useful reminder that cybersecurity considerations can begin before the charger is installed, including understanding who manages the system, how it connects to the internet, what data it handles, and whether it can be isolated from other church networks. Taking these considerations into account during procurement and installation can reduce the chance that a convenient new amenity creates an unexpected security gap.

Victim Decision-Making During Ransomware

The Gate 15 article, “Victim Decision-Making During Ransomware,” highlights the importance of preparing organizations to make high-stakes decisions when ransomware disrupts operations and limits access to information. Research shows that organizations often rely on trusted advisors, including leadership, legal counsel, cybersecurity professionals, insurers, and law enforcement. Tested backups and established recovery plans can give organizations greater confidence in rejecting ransom demands, while pre-established decision-making authority and communication procedures reduce confusion during an incident. The key takeaway is that ransomware preparedness should include practicing decision-making, not just technical recovery, making tabletop exercises valuable for testing roles, identifying gaps, and preparing leaders for difficult decisions.